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Article 
The Irrelevance of Nanotechnology Patents 
EMILY MICHIKO MORRIS 
Although scientists have for decades now had the ability to manipulate matter at the 
atomic level, we have yet to see the nanotechnological revolution that these scientists 
predicted would follow. Despite the years of effort and billions of dollars that have been 
invested into research and development thus far, nanotechnology has yielded surprisingly 
few end-user applications. A number of commentators have blamed this lack of progress on 
the Bayh-Dole Act and other changes to patent law, arguing that, although these laws are 
supposed to stimulate technological development, they have in fact had the exact opposite 
effect when it comes to nanotechnology. Because universities now own too many “upstream” 
patent rights with the potential to obstruct “downstream” development of usable 
applications, their argument goes, the Bayh-Dole Act has caused an unnecessary drag on 
nanotechnology development. This Article shows, however, that contrary to this common 
criticism, patents on university-based nanotechnology research are most often simply 
irrelevant.  
While nanotechnology applications have been slow to emerge, this Article shows that 
the latency in development is due not to patents but rather to the fact that nanotechnology is 
a science-based technology and as such faces various additional hurdles that far outweigh 
the potential effect of any upstream patenting by universities. Just the inherent technological 
difficulties alone of working in science-based fields makes development cycles in these fields 
unavoidably long. To make matter worse, science-based fields typically also face issues with 
tacit knowledge and the lack of widespread expertise as well as the “valley of death” and the 
difficulties of attracting investment in intermediate-stage development. Add to this mix 
constraints due to concerns about public health and safety along with limited access to 
proprietary materials and equipment and it is not difficult to understand why nanotechnology 
development has not advanced as quickly as some might have hoped. Thus, while 
nanotechnology and other science-based technologies may occasionally experience patent-
related holdup problems, development in these fields would be more effectively addressed by 
looking instead at the multitude of other, nonpatent factors that pose well-recognized 
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The Irrelevance of Nanotechnology Patents 
EMILY MICHIKO MORRIS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Once the stuff of science fiction, nanotechnology is now expected to be 
the next technological revolution.1 For over thirty years, the United States 
government has invested several billion dollars into research and 
development of technologies that exploit the unusual qualities of matter at 
the atomic level.2 All of this enthusiasm has yielded thousands of 
nanotechnology patents3 but little in the way of revolutionary new products 
and applications. We have yet to see the brave new world of efficient energy 
sources and targeted, cell-specific chemotherapy delivery systems that 
nanotechnology researchers have been working to develop for years, and the 
self-replicating nanobots we see in Star Trek and other science fiction seem 
to be nothing more than that—science fiction.4 “Nanotechnology” has 
become less of a technological revolution and instead more of buzzword to 
create hype for otherwise mundane products that have little to do with actual 
                                                                                                                          
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law, and Eastern Scholar, Shanghai 
University of Political Science and Law. Many thanks to Miriam Bitton, Bernard Chao, David Friedman, 
Deborah Halbert, Matthew David, Stuart Graham, Lital Helman, Peter Lee, Mark Lemley, John Golden, 
Lateef Mtima, Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Lucas Osborn, Laura Pedraza-Farina, Ted Sichelman, Ofer Tur-
Sinai, and Greg Vetter; the Ono Academic College Faculty of Law, Kiryat Ono, Israel. This project was 
made possible in part by generous grants from The Program for Professors of Special Appointment 
(Eastern Scholars) at Shanghai Institutions of Higher Learning, and from the Shanghai University of 
Political Science and Law, to whom the author expresses her gratitude. 
1 Graham Reynolds, Nanotechnology and the Tragedy of the Anticommons: Towards a Strict Utility 
Requirement, 6 U. OTTAWA L. TECH. J. 79, 81 (2009). 
2 Requests for federal funding of nanotechnology research and development totaled almost two-
billion dollars in fiscal year 2013 alone. JOHN C. MONICA, NANOTECHNOLOGY LAW § 2:116 (2014); see 
also Ted Sabety, Nanotechnology Innovation and the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote 
Growth?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 477, 504–05 (2005) (noting that venture capital investments are 
much smaller by comparison); Rachel Lorey Allen, Venture Capital Investment in Nanotechnology, 
JONES DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/practiceperspectives/nanotechnology/venture_capital.html 
[https://perma.cc/T4G3-R3VY] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) (similar). 
3 Raj Bawa, Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation and the Crisis at the U.S. Patent Office, 17 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 699, 707 n.26 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
601, 604, 604 n.14 (2005); Siva Vaidhyanathan, Nanotechnologies and the Law of Patents: A Collision 
Course, in NANOTECHNOLOGY: RISK, ETHICS AND LAW 225, 227 (Geoffrey Hunt & Michael Mehta eds., 
2006). 
4 Lemley, supra note 3, at 602; MONICA, supra note 2, § 1:10; Douglas Sharrott & Sachin Gupta, 
How to Cope with the Expiration of Early Nanotechnology Patents, 8 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 159, 160 
(2011). 
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nanotechnological breakthroughs.5 Any real nanotechnological shift in the 
way we manufacture goods and the materials we use seems to remain a 
distant future, stuck in a holding pattern as a perpetually immature field, an 
“emerging science,” and a “new technology.”6 Why?  
Professor Mark Lemley and a number of others have suggested that the 
answer to this puzzling question is simple: nanotechnology differs from all 
of the technologies that came before it.7 As the first major new technological 
field after the Bayh-Dole Act8 and other related statutes and changes to 
patentability standards,9 nanotechnology has experienced an unprecedented 
boom in patenting, particularly on basic research and research tools. What 
is more, an unprecedented number of these patents are held by universities.10 
Patents on “upstream” research of this nature have the potential to obstruct 
“downstream” development of usable products and other applications.11 
Lemley and others argue that the Bayh-Dole Act, which now encourages 
recipients of government research funding to patent the resulting basic 
research, has caused an anticommons—or a thicket—of patents so dense and 
overwhelming that it is stunting nanotechnology development, a problem 
yet further exacerbated by nanotechnology’s potentially cross-disciplinary 
nature.12 Although patents are supposed to promote technological progress, 
Bayh-Dole has created simply too many patents in nanotechnology. 
This Article shows that a “tragedy of the anticommons” characterization 
                                                                                                                          
5 JOHN C. MILLER ET AL., THE HANDBOOK OF NANOTECHNOLOGY: BUSINESS, POLICY, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 151–52 (2005); Jue Wang & Philip Shapira, Partnering with 
Universities: A Good Choice for Nanotechnology Start-Up Firms?, 38 SMALL BUS. ECON. 197, 203 
(2012), http:/link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11187-009-9248-9 [https://perma.cc/Z55S-ZLAF].   
6 E.g., Zia Akhtar, Nanotechnology: Meeting the Challenges of Innovation, Production, and 
Licensing, 9 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 133, 133–34 (2012); Frederick A. Fiedler & Glenn H. Reynolds, 
Legal Problems of Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593, 594–95 (1994); 
Lemley, supra note 3, at 605; Frank Murray et al., Defense Drivers for Nanotechnology 
Commercialization: Technology, Case Studies, and Legal Issues, 9 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 4, 5 (2012). 
Most commentators agree that the field of nanotechnology has existed since at least the mid-1980s. See, 
e.g., Francisco Castro, Legal and Regulatory Concerns Facing Nanotechnology, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. 
PROP. 140, 140 (2004) (citing nanotechnology’s “formal existence” to the publication of K. ERIC 
DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION: THE COMING ERA OF NANOTECHNOLOGY (1st ed. 1986)); Reynolds, 
supra note 1, at 87 (same). 
7 Lemley, supra note 3, at 605–06. 
8 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2000) (incorporating the Bayh-Dole Act’s provisions into the Patent 
Act).  
9 See infra text accompanying notes 60–68. 
10 Lemley, supra note 3, at 601, 605–06. 
11 Cf. Sabety, supra note 2, at 481 n.12 (describing “upstream” as “seminal breakthrough 
inventions” and “downstream” as “follow-on . . . innovations”). 
12 Lemley, supra note 3, passim; see also Joel D’Silva, Pools, Thickets and Open Source 
Nanotechnology, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 300, passim (2009); Terry K. Tullis, Comment, 
Application of the Government License Defense to Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research: The 
Case for a Limited Patent Compulsory Licensing Regime, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 279, passim (2005); 
Bawa, supra note 3, passim; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 81–85, 96–98.  
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of development in nanotechnology is too simple. Lemley is correct that 
nanotechnology development has been slow, but not for the reasons he 
suggests. In fact, for many, if not most, aspects of nanotechnology 
development, patents on university-based research are simply irrelevant. 
This Article shows that in nascent but complex fields like nanotechnology, 
technological and economic uncertainty, long development cycles, tacit 
knowledge, lack of funding, and even regulatory and safety issues are likely 
to be much more significant and rate-limiting than patents are. In this way, 
nanotechnology is not nearly as unique as Lemley suggests; 
nanotechnology’s developmental difficulties are the same, well-known 
difficulties that other science-based technologies face. This is not to say that 
all nanotechnology patents are irrelevant or that an “anticommons” could 
never interfere in the development of nanotechnology applications. The 
point here is simply that patenting of basic research, whether by universities 
or any other entities, is not the problem. Those concerned about the lack of 
progress in nanotechnology would be better served to look at the multitude 
of other factors, such as lack of funding, limited access to expertise and 
materials, long development cycles, and public-safety concerns, that are well 
known to slow research-intensive fields such as nanotechnology and 
biotechnology.13 
The following discussion examines the characteristics of science-based 
technologies and explains why patents likely play a minimal role, at least at 
this point, in nanotechnology development, particularly with regard to 
university patenting on upstream technology under the Bayh-Dole Act and 
its related statutes. Section I provides a general description of 
nanotechnology, its origins, and its potentially cross-disciplinary effect. 
Section II then briefly describes the concern, as put forth by Professor 
Lemley and other commentators, that high levels of university patenting on 
basic research has created and continues to create an anticommons that is 
stifling nanotechnology development. Section III provides a different story, 
however. First, as in biotechnology, anticommons in nanotechnology are 
probably more feared than real at this stage. Second, and more importantly, 
Section III shows why it is more likely that development of early-stage 
university research in nanotechnology is suffering not from problems caused 
by patenting under Bayh-Dole but from many of the same nonpatent 
problems that have always affected science-based technologies. This latter 
group of problems—including tacit knowledge,14 the valley of death,15  
safety concerns,16 and more17—are currently much larger obstacles than any 
                                                                                                                          
13 See infra Section III.B. 
14 For a discussion of tacit knowledge, see infra Section III.B.4. 
15 For a discussion of the valley of death, see infra Section III.B.2. 
16 For a discussion of safety concerns, see infra Section III.B.6. 
17 Infra Section III.B. 
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that patents might pose at this point in nanotechnology’s development. 
I. NANOTECHNOLOGY: THE BASICS 
Named after the nanometer, or one billionth of a meter,18 
nanotechnology is the study of the unique physical and chemical 
characteristics of matter at the sub-microscopic level.19 At this scale, 
substances often display different physical and chemical properties because 
the high surface-area-to-volume ratio allows otherwise very weak quantum 
forces to dominate over other physical forces.20 This difference causes the 
melting points, electrical conductivity, reflectivity, tensile strength, and 
magnetic and optical properties of matter to vary in surprising ways from 
their macroscopic forms.21 By leveraging these differences, scientists have 
been able to create some amazing new materials. Researchers have now been 
successful in synthesizing miraculously light, yet strong materials, such as 
carbon nanotubes that are one-sixth the weight but one hundred times the 
strength of steel,22 carbon fullerenes (“buckyballs”) that can be used for 
targeted drug delivery to individual cells,23 and semiconductor nanocrystals 
(“quantum dots”) small enough to map DNA sequences.24 Bar-coded 
nanowires can be used to create nanoscale sensors that can identify 
biowarfare pathogens at sensitivity levels never before seen.25 The branched 
structure of dendrimers can be used as drug-release mechanisms that 
simultaneously monitor body vitals to regulate dosages.26 Nanotechnology 
is expected to revolutionize a wide array of industries, including medicine, 
                                                                                                                          
18 As a point of reference, a single helium atom is approximately one tenth of a nanometer in 
diameter, and a ribosome, a very small intracellular organelle, is approximately twenty nanometers in 
diameter. D’Silva, supra note 12, at 300. 
19 Id.; Bawa, supra note 3, at 704; Amit Makker, Note, The Nanotechnology Patent Thicket and the 
Path to Commercialization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2011). 
20 SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS OF NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY: NAT’L SCI. FDN. NSET 
WORKSHOP REPORT passim (Mihail C. Roco & William Sim Bainbridge eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS], http://www.wtec.org/loyola/nano/NSET.Societal.Implications/nanosi.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4KKY-U3CK]; Bawa, supra note 3, at 705; Gunter Festel et al., Importance and Best 
Practice of Early Stage Nanotechnology Investments, 7 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 50, 50 (2010); Siddarth 
Khanijou, Patent Inequity?: Rethinking the Application of Strict Liability to Patent Law in the 
Nanotechnology Era, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y  179, 187 (2007). 
21 SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 20; Bawa, supra note 3, at 705; Festel et al., supra note 20, 
at 50; Khanijou, supra note 20, at 187. 
22 William J. Simmons, Nanotechnology as a Nascent Technological Model for Immediate 
Substantive United States and Japan Patent Law Harmonization, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 753, 774 
(2007). 
23 Behfar Bastani & Dennis Fernandez, Intellectual Property Rights in Nanotechnology, INTELL. 
PROP. TODAY 36, at text accompanying note 19 (Aug. 2002), http://www.iploft.com/Nanotechnology.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MWB7-WVLU]. 
24 David S. Almeling, Note, Patenting Nanotechnology: Problems with the Utility Requirement, 
2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, P8 (2004). 
25 Murray et al., supra note 6, at 14. 
26 Id. at 15. 
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energy, textiles, and electronics, leading many to hail nanotechnology as “a 
key technology for economic development in the twenty-first century”27 and 
to compare nanotechnology to the steam engine, transistor, and the Internet 
in its potential effect on society.28 
Like many pioneering technologies, nanotechnology originated largely 
through basic research performed by government-funded universities and 
federal laboratories. Governments around the world have invested billions 
of dollars in nanotechnology research, with private industry and investors 
quickly following suit.29 In the United States, for example, both federal and 
state government support for nanotechnology has expanded geometrically 
over the last two decades.30 By 2001, Congress and President Clinton had 
established the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to promote and 
coordinate nanotechnology research among several federal agencies, 
including the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the 
National Institutes of Health, and the Department of Justice;31 by 2017 the 
NNI’s total investment in nanotechnology will exceed $24 billion.32 
Developed countries around the world have made similar investments in 
anticipation of the “next industrial revolution.”33 
The field continues to be very much in its infancy, however, and the 
value of nanotechnology innovations remains highly speculative.34 Much of 
nanotechnology is still in the early research stages and has yet to be 
developed into marketable products.35 According to the Project on Emerging 
                                                                                                                          
27 Maryam Ahmadi & Leila Ahmadi, Intellectual Property Rights of Bionanotechnology in Related 
International Documents, 8 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 289, 289 (2011). 
28 E.g., Neal Lane & Thomas Kalil, The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Present at the 
Creation, 21 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. (2005), http://issues.org/21-4/lane/ [https://perma.cc/8YES-AJB4]. 
29 Bawa, supra note 3, at 701. 
30 Simmons, supra note 22, at 775–76. 
31 Jordan Paradise, Reassessing Safety for Nanotechnology Combination Products: What Do 
Biosimilars Add to Regulatory Challenges for the FDA?, 56 ST. LOUIS L.J. 465, 474 (2012). 
32 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH. & THE SUBCOMM. ON NANOSCALE SCI., ENG’G, 
& TECH., THE NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE: SUPPLEMENT TO THE PRESIDENT’S 2017 
BUDGET 3 (Mar. 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/
nni_fy17_budget_supplement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GXB-DXMK]. This author has been unable to find 
a reliable estimate of what proportion of the U.S. government’s overall R&D spending is devoted to 
nanotechnology, however, because of the interdisciplinary nature of nanotechnology and the consequent 
difficulty of identifying nanotechnology funding separately from funding in other fields. 
33 See Allen, supra note 2 (noting China, South Korea, and the E.U.’s nanotechnology investments); 
Simmons, supra note 22, at 777–78 (noting Japan’s multibillion dollar investments in nanotech); see also 
NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, COMM. ON TECH. & THE SUBCOMM. ON NANOSCALE SCI., ENG'G, & 
TECH., NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUPPORTING THE 
NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, SUPPLEMENT TO THE PRESIDENT’S 2004 BUDGET 1 (2003), 
http://www.nano.gov/sites/default/files/pub_resource/nni04_budget_supplement.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U3KD-456H] (referring to nanotech as an “industrial revolution”). For more detail on private-industry 
investment in nanotechnology R&D, on the other hand, see infra text accompanying notes 257–62. 
34 Lane & Kalil, supra note 28. 
35 Lemley, supra note 3, at 604. 
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Nanotechnologies’ survey, 1,628 consumer products on the market 
contained nanomaterials as of 2013,36 and many products contain only small 
amounts of nanotechnology.37 Most of these products represent incremental 
improvements to existing technologies, such as stain-resistant nanocoatings, 
high-tech tennis rackets, ski wax, and sunscreen.38 Yet other products bear 
the “nano” name more to create buzz than to give an accurate description of 
the underlying product.39 The radical new “disruptive” technologies that 
many expected nanotechnology to produce have yet to appear, however,40 
leading many to note that, despite the large sums of money invested in the 
field thus far, surprisingly few groundbreaking nanotechnology products 
have reached the market.41 The lack of current commercial value 
notwithstanding, a surprisingly large number of patents on basic 
nanotechnology research have been filed by both universities and private 
firms. In fact, critics claim that very few of the nanotechnology inventions 
created thus far have not been patented; patents have issued on carbon 
nanotubes, quantum dots, nanowires, dendrimers, atomic-force 
microscopes, and many other basic tools and materials.42  
At first glance, it is not surprising that everyone wants to get in early on 
the patent “gold rush” of the next major industrial revolution. Closer 
inspection reveals that basic research patents in nanotechnology are 
something of an oddity. Patents are popularly conceived of as a mechanism 
for incentivizing investment in technological research and development 
(R&D) by helping investors appropriate returns on their investments ex post 
by charging for access to the patented inventions.43 Because the vast 
majority of nanotechnology research conducted thus far has been funded 
through the federal government,44 patent protection would seem 
unnecessary; technologies that have been funded ex ante through 
                                                                                                                          
36 Inventory Finds Increase in Consumer Products Containing Nanoscale Materials, PROJECT ON 
EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.nanotechproject.org/news/archive/9242/ 
[https://perma.cc/2ZAP-UQHY]. 
37 Josh Wolfe, Blue Chips Stack Up on Nanotechnology, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2005, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2005/10/24/motorola-lucent-hp-nano-ppg-cz_jw_1024soapbox_inl.html. 
38 Akhtar, supra note 6, at 134; Andrew Wasson, Protecting the Next Small Thing: Nanotechnology 
and the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10, 10 (2004). 
39 MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 151–52. 
40 Allen, supra note 2. 
41 E.g., Sean O'Neill et al., Broad Claiming in Nanotechnology Patents: Is Litigation Inevitable?, 4 
NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 29, 31 (2007) (noting the lack of nanotechnology products in the marketplace); 
Lemley, supra note 3, at 604, 623 (stating that nanotechnology “has so far produced few actual 
products”); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Protecting Innovation in Computer Software, Biotechnology, and 
Nanotechnology, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 42, 46 (2011) (arguing that few nanotech products on the market 
truly represent the unique characteristics of nanotechnology). 
42 Lemley, supra note 3, at 613–14; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 86. 
 43 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology Policy Perspective on the NIH Gene Patenting Controversy, 
55 U. PITT. L. REV. 633, 648 (1994). 
44 Sabety, supra note 2, at 504–05. 
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government or other monies do not require the incentive of patent 
exclusivity.45 Patenting on research already funded by the government also 
violates the “reward theory” of patenting, by which patents serve primarily 
to afford the opportunity to appropriate private returns on investments in 
invention and innovation.46 Allowing patents on inventions that have been 
funded through government-collected taxpayer funds also effectively 
charges the public twice.47 
Indeed, the type of research and development that governments are most 
likely to fund ex ante are exactly those that the prospect of patent exclusivity 
is unable to incentivize. Basic—or, “pure”—research, particularly in 
complex and unpredictable fields such as biotechnology and 
nanotechnology, is often thought to be too uncertain and distant in value to 
be attractive as investments to private firms.48 Even when protected by 
patents, the expected value of such basic research will be less than its 
expected cost, and private firms will invest their resources in areas with more 
certain returns.49 Because basic scientific and technological research has 
great public value, however, governments step in and use public funds to 
subsidize research that otherwise might never be funded.50  
In the wake of the Bayh-Dole and the Stevenson-Wydler Acts, however, 
university patenting on government-funded and other research increased 
dramatically.51 Levels of university patenting increased by more than 
eightfold between the late 1970s and the 1990s, with universities spending 
almost six times as much on patenting in 2004 as they did in 1991, and this 
upward trend continues to this day.52 How much of this increase in 
                                                                                                                          
45 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology 
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666–67 (1996); Arti K. Rai & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROB. 289, 300–01 (2003). 
46 Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Comment, Patents, Prospects and Economic 
Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 198 (1980). 
47 Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1666; Michael S. Mireles, Adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act in 
Developed Countries: Added Pressure for a Broad Research Exemption in the United States?, 59 ME. L. 
REV. 259, 261 (2007); Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 631 (2011). 
48 Suzanne Scotchmer & Stephen M. Maurer, Innovation Today: Private-Public Partnership, in 
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 227, 230 (2004); Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 
1695–96. 
49 GEORGE S. FORD ET AL., PHOENIX CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY 
STUDIES, A VALLEY OF DEATH IN THE INNOVATION SEQUENCE: AN ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION 11 
(2007); Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and 
Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 352 (2000). 
50 Scotchmer & Maurer, supra note 48, at 244, 246. 
51 David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 985, 989 (2005); Mireles, supra note 47, at 264. 
52 ASS’N UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2014 (2016); Richard R. 
Nelson, Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise of Patenting at American Universities, 26 J. TECH. 
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university-based, upstream patenting is actually due to changes in the law is 
unclear. Much of the increase in university-centered biomedical research 
patenting occurred simultaneously with an increase in government funding 
for such research,53 and the high proportion of university-owned patents that 
we see in nanotechnology may likewise be due to the fact that government 
funding continues to be one of the main drivers of research in the area.  
Regardless of the reasons for the increase in university patenting of 
upstream research, however, a number of commentators have expressed 
grave doubts about the wisdom of such patenting patterns. Commentators 
like Professor Lemley and others argue that the large volume of upstream, 
university-owned patenting makes nanotechnology development uniquely 
ripe for anticommons and other holdup problems.54 But are patents truly the 
problem? Or is development in a science-based technology like 
nanotechnology unavoidably slow for a variety of reasons that have little to 
do with patenting at this point in time? The following two sections address 
each of these explanations to show that upstream patents held by universities 
and other government funding recipients likely have little to do with the slow 
rate of nanotechnology development thus far. 
II. LEMLEY’S STORY: THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS 
Lemley and other commentators on nanotechnology development argue 
that a combination of three patent-related factors have paradoxically slowed 
progress in nanotechnology. First, liberalization of both patentable subject 
matter restrictions and patentable utility standards in the 1980s and 1990s 
paved the way for patenting on technology much earlier in the research and 
development process.55 Second, because nanotechnology is a uniquely 
cross-disciplinary field, the increase in upstream research patents may have 
a particularly broad effect on downstream development.56 Third, enactment 
of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 encouraged patenting of government-funded 
research, resulting not only in a marked surge in upstream patenting but also 
a new class of patent holders that lack either the expertise or the orientation 
to license their patent effectively.57 The combined effect of these three 
changes in patenting patterns is to create an anticommons, or 
overparcelization of patent rights, that inflates transaction costs and hinders 
                                                                                                                          
TRANSFER 13, 13 (2001); Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why Universities Should 
Take a Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REV. 407, 419 (2007). 
53 David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Academic Patents and Materials Transfer Agreements: 
Substitutes or Complements?, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 157, 158 (2007). But see Eisenberg, supra note 45, 
at 1702–05 (questioning whether pre-Bayh-Dole government patents were actually underutilized). 
54 Lemley, supra note 3, at 620. 
55 Id. at 613. 
56 Id. at 614. 
57 Id. at 617. 
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downstream development.58 And as the first major technological field to 
emerge since these changes, critics argue, nanotechnology development may 
now suffer from the same tragedy of the anticommons and other holdup 
problems that these changes may have caused in biotechnology as well.59  
First, many commentators assert that nanotechnology has experienced a 
high level of patenting on upstream, basic research due to relaxation of both 
patentable subject matter and patentable utility standards, both of which 
occurred around the same time in the early 1980s.60 According to the critics, 
changes in the patentability of both basic research and federally-funded 
research now allow universities to patent more of their nanotechnology 
research and to patent it earlier in the research process than ever before. For 
example, naturally occurring products, laws of nature, and abstract ideas 
have long been held to be unpatentable subject matter.61 The Supreme 
Court’s 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty62 is widely thought to 
have relaxed these restrictions, however, by lowering the bar for what can 
be deemed a patentable modification or “application” of a naturally 
occurring product or law of nature.63 As a result, basic nanotechnology 
research on previously unrecognized characteristics of substances at the 
nanoscopic level have become more likely to be patentable with only minor 
modifications over the substances’ naturally occurring forms.64 Similar case 
law on the utility requirement, such as In re Brana,65 in addition to revisions 
to the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO’s) 1995 Utility 
Guidelines, also have loosened the utility requirements for so-called 
research tools or research intermediates.66 As a result, much basic, upstream 
research has now become patentable even though it typically requires a good 
deal of further downstream investment and development to be incorporated 
                                                                                                                          
58 Id. at 618. 
59 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (discussing the tragedy of the anticommons in 
scientific research in biotechnology); Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 640 (same). 
60 E.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 613, 628; Simmons, supra note 22, at 783–85. 
  61 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see also Mark Williamson & James 
Carpenter, Traversing Art Rejections in Nanotechnology Patent Applications—No Small Task, 7 
NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 131, 137–38 n.40 (2010) (citing cases).   
 62 447 U.S. at 303. 
63 Id. at at 309 (declining to hold genetically modified bacteria to be unpatentable subject matter 
simply because they are living organisms and because they derive from products of nature); Symposium, 
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Experimental Use Defense to Patent Infringement, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 129, 141,141 n.130 (2006). 
65 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that patents do not have to reach FDA approval in 
order to meet the utility requirement). 
66 Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36, 263 (July 14, 1995). 
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into usable end products with real-world utility.67 The creation of the United 
States Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit in 1982 and its perceived pro-
patent stance are alleged to have softened the various patentability 
requirements, further intensifying upstream patenting in new fields such as 
nanotechnology.68  
The overall effect of these and other changes in the patent system has 
led to early-stage research patents on “incomplete” inventions that have little 
in the way of immediate application. By patenting incomplete inventions, 
researchers leave much of the development work to others while reserving 
to themselves the ability to charge downstream royalties or licensing fees, 
effectively allowing upstream patentees to extract rents from downstream 
developers. To make matters worse, the boundaries of upstream research 
patents are also thought to be more vague. Because upstream research itself 
tends to be more conceptual and abstract, it has the potential to cover broad 
ranges of downstream developments, further enhancing its preemptive 
effects.69  
In a related vein, many commentators complain that nanotechnology 
suffers from not only greater upstream patenting but also poorer patent 
quality.70 In addition to common criticisms about the USPTO’s high 
application backlog, high examiner turnover rates, and so on,71 any new field 
such as nanotechnology presents obvious difficulties for the USPTO. New 
technologies, particularly complex ones like nanotechnology, pose steep 
learning curves for USPTO examiners, few of whom will have the necessary 
expertise for evaluating nanotechnology patent applications.72 New 
technologies obviously also lack the kind of robust prior art that exists in 
more established fields, making it more challenging to identify inventions 
that fail to meet the novelty or nonobviousness requirements.73 The fact that 
many nanotechnological details are easily maintained as trade secrets means 
that patenting likely does not reflect the total level of nanotechnology 
innovation and, more importantly, does not adequately reflect the existing 
                                                                                                                          
67 David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in 
the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1689–90 (2007); Reynolds, supra note 1, at 105. 
68 E.g., Sabety, supra note 2, at 488 n.47; see also Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry 
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Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 349 (2009) (noting that the Federal Circuit 
has been “largely perceived as propatent”). 
69 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 839, 884 (1990); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical 
Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 813, 839–40 (2001). 
70 E.g., Bawa, supra note 3, at 717–18. 
71 Id. at 724–27. 
72 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 
1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 121 (2001); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 699. 
73 Akhtar, supra note 6, at 138; Bawa, supra note 3, at 707–09. 
 
 2016] THE IRRELEVANCE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS 511 
level of applicable prior art in the field.74 
Moreover, even standardizing terminology can present challenges for 
new technologies. The USPTO did not have a separate nanotech 
classification until 2004, when it first established Class 977 for patent 
applications in this field, and even then, the 977 category includes only 
inventions that exploit those phenomena occurring at one hundred 
nanometers or less.75 Because experts in nanotechnology argue that 
characteristics occurring at up to three hundred nanometers in size should 
also qualify as nanotechnology for regulatory purposes,76 977’s current 
parameters may be too narrow to include all relevant nanotechnology 
applications and prior art, particularly with regard to nanomedicine and 
nanobiotechnology, which often lie outside of 977’s one hundred nanometer 
size limit.77 And with high patenting levels and steep learning curves come 
inevitable delays in examining and issuing patents; the backlog of nanotech 
patent applications and their average pendency have both increased over the 
years.78 The uncertainty caused by long patent pendencies can deter 
downstream developers from entering a field for fear of infringing yet-
unissued patents.79  
A second fact that concerns many commentators is nanotechnology’s 
cross-disciplinary nature, a characteristic that may be unique to 
nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is unusual in that it is defined solely by 
size;80 the exact size limits on what constitutes nanotechnology are in 
dispute,81 but any phenomenon that occurs at the nanoscopic level could be 
argued to qualify as nanotechnology. Given the breadth of this definition, 
nanotechnology has the potential to revolutionize any number of fields, 
including biotechnology, electronics, energy, medicine, and materials 
sciences.82 Nanotech is thus more size-specific than discipline-specific, 
which creates some additional issues not seen in most fields. Relevant prior 
                                                                                                                          
74 Lemley, supra note 3, at 617. 
75 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASS 977 NANOTECHNOLOGY CROSS-REFERENCE ART 
COLLECTION, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/class_977_nanotechnology_cross-
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NANOTECHNOLOGY IN FOOD & AGRICULTURE 3 (2008), http://www.foe.org/system/
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77 Bawa, supra note 3, at 707. 
78 Raj Bawa, Patents and Nanomedicine, 2 NANOMEDICINE 351, 358 (2007). 
79 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 699; Shapiro, supra note 72, at 121. 
80 Bawa, supra note 3, at 704. 
81 Id. 
82 Lemley, supra note 3, at 614. 
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art becomes more difficult to identify and the appropriate skill level by 
which to measure patentability becomes more difficult to define.83 More 
importantly, nanotechnology’s cross-disciplinarity multiplies its potential 
applications, giving patents in nanotechnology unusually broad effects in 
many different areas of development.84 Those who work in downstream 
nanotech development may need to negotiate licensing from patent holders 
outside of their own fields and often may be caught infringing patents from 
fields well outside of what they might reasonably have been expected to 
review.85 
The third factor on which Professor Lemley and others predicate their 
nanotechnology anticommons argument is the Bayh-Dole Act.86 Before 
Bayh-Dole took effect, universities and other government-funding recipients 
had frequently been unable to patent their research, as government agencies 
sometimes would not allow retention of intellectual property rights on 
research funded through government grants.87 The Bayh-Dole Act 
specifically changed these policies, not only to allow patenting but in fact to 
promote patent ownership by the recipients of federal funds. Specifically, 
the Bayh-Dole Act (formally, the Patent and Trademark Law Amendments 
Act of 1980) set a policy for all federal agencies funding technological 
research to encourage small businesses and nonprofit organizations such as 
universities to retain title to their research by filing for patents on it.88 The 
somewhat controversial justification for this change was to address the 
perceived underutilization of government-funded research and to attract 
private investment in developing and commercializing such research.89 The 
post-Bayh-Dole era saw a marked increase in patenting on government-
funded research in not only nanotechnology but also other research fields, 
particularly biotechnology.90  
One particular twist that Bayh-Dole adds to the mix, moreover, is the 
concomitant growth in universities as patentees. Bayh-Dole has increased 
university patenting by about sixteen fold,91 with estimates putting 
                                                                                                                          
83 Williamson & Carpenter, supra note 61, at 139–40. 
84 Lemley, supra note 3, at 614–15. 
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86 Adelman, supra note 51, at 989. 
87 Sabety, supra note 2, at 484–85. 
88 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); see Eisenberg, supra note 45; Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit 
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university patenting at about 12% of all nanotechnology patenting and 
20.2% of all biomedical nanotech patenting, levels far exceeding university 
patenting of approximately 1% in other technologies.92 Universities do not 
and cannot further commercialize their own research, however, and this 
uncoupling between invention and commercialization means that 
universities and private industry must incur the costs of finding and 
transacting with one another in order for research to be developed into usable 
end products.93 
As a result, patent-licensing negotiations after Bayh-Dole now more 
frequently involve unwonted partners in the form of academically oriented 
universities transacting with commercially oriented firms. The transactions 
necessary to develop research-based technologies have become not only 
more numerous—because patents now exist where they had not before—but 
also more complicated, because private industry must now negotiate with 
universities in ways that they had not before. Universities are still disinclined 
to view themselves as commercial entities, moreover,94 and even university 
technology transfer offices (TTOs) do not have the market-based approaches 
that private commercial entities do.95 Almost thirty-five years after Bayh-
Dole was enacted, universities are still unaccustomed to the commercial 
world and lack the experience and expertise necessary for patent licensing.96 
Universities also have very different internal authority structures than do 
more commercial laboratories, and universities serve multiple different 
constituencies whose often differing goals and agendas often prolong 
licensing negotiations.97  
According to Professor Lemley and other critics, the combination of 
lowered patentability standards, cross-disciplinarity, and increases in 
university patenting created a perfect storm of nanotechnology patents that 
                                                                                                                          
92 Lemley, supra note 3, at 615–16; Murray et al., supra note 6, at 31. 
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are not just numerous but also broad, overlapping, and fragmented in 
ownership.98 Extrapolating from Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg’s 
famous article on the tragedy of the anticommons in biomedical research, 
Lemley posits that the explosion of university-owned upstream research 
patents poses an even greater risk of an anticommons in nanotechnology as 
well.99 Anticommons and other holdup problems occur when rights to a 
particular piece of property are distributed among too many owners, 
resulting in decreased use of those property rights because of the difficulties 
of bringing all the rights holders to agreement on how to use their collective 
property.100 In the case of technology, “overparcelization” of patent property 
rights may similarly cause underdevelopment of a given technology.101 In 
some cases, a patent may cover a component used only in combination with 
one or more complementary components that themselves may be subject to 
separate patent rights, requiring horizontal patent coordination to be used in 
a productive way.102 In other cases upstream and downstream patent rights 
cover “cumulative” technologies, in which separate patented technologies 
must be vertically coordinated in order to create a single product or 
process.103 The need for horizontal or vertical patent coordination could be 
particularly likely in nanotechnology given that so many basic 
nanotechnology tools and nanomaterials have been patented.104 Another 
source of holdup problems are patent thickets, in which patent rights are 
particularly dense because patents overlap with one another in scope.105 This 
latter type of holdup problem is also thought to pose a particular risk to 
nanotechnology development, where large numbers of potentially 
overlapping patents cover multiple aspects and versions of materials like 
carbon nanotubes and semiconducting nanocrystals.106 Because patents on 
upstream nanotechnology already number in the thousands, with the rate of 
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new patent applications accelerating over time, the risk of underuse and 
obstruction due to anticommons or other hold ups could just grow worse. 
In a Coasean world of zero transaction costs,107 however, even highly 
balkanized patent rights could be easily overcome through bargaining and 
exchange. Where parcelized patent rights are owned by the same entity in a 
patent portfolio, for example, holdup problems are unlikely to occur. When 
patent rights are distributed among multiple owners, however, transaction 
costs become an issue, particularly when conflicting interests, rent-seeking, 
strategic behavior, and cognitive biases frustrate agreement to use the 
patents jointly.108 University ownership of patents as well as the potentially 
cross-disciplinary relevance of those patents make transaction costs an even 
greater concern in nanotech. 
Again, university TTOs have different interests, expertise levels, and 
governance structures than do the private industry actors with whom they 
might negotiate licenses, a factor that can significantly exacerbate 
transaction costs. Horizontal competitors with similar values and interests 
will find it easier to come to formal or informal agreements, particularly if 
repeated over time.109 Similarly situated private firms with patent portfolios 
of similar value, for example, may face little difficulty in cross licensing 
their portfolios. Universities obviously have very different interests and 
incentives than private industry, however, and agreeing on terms for 
licensing university patents is often a long and laborious process. These 
types of conflicts are what this author has previously termed “qualitative,” 
as opposed to a “quantitative” anticommons, in which, regardless of the 
number of rights holders, the heterogeneity of transacting parties and the 
divergence of their respective interests and incentives can multiply 
transaction costs.110 
Differences of opinion may hinder patent licensing in other ways as 
well. Rights holders may attempt to hold out for a disproportionate share of 
any joint rents, for example, knowing that their contribution is essential to 
the success of the project.111 Universities in particular tend to overestimate 
the value of their contributions to downstream development, as the academic 
mindset typically places greater value on research than on 
commercialization.112 Universities frequently demand reach-through 
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licenses to downstream products as well, allowing them to extract an even 
greater share of any returns from commercialization.113  
The cross-industry applicability of basic nanotech inventions and 
research also allows universities and other upstream patent holders to exert 
unusually broad influence over downstream development in a wide number 
of fields. Universities and even private industry may be able to influence 
nanotechnology development not only in their own industries but also in 
other industries as well. The cross-industry applicability of nanotech patents 
thus raises the risk of both qualitative and quantitative anticommons, as the 
number of parties needing to license nanotech patents, as well as the number 
of nanotech patents themselves, increase with the number of industries 
affected.114 
Simply having to pay licensing fees or royalties for one or more 
“upstream” patents reduces incentives to invest in downstream 
development,115 and the more patents that must be licensed, the more that 
royalties must be stacked, and the more that incentives to invest in 
development are reduced.116 And where invention costs are low, such as 
when invention costs are subsidized by the government, patents serve not so 
much to spur technological development as to deter it.117 In these 
circumstances, a fully competitive environment at the margins—i.e., one 
without patent protections—would better foster downstream 
development.118 Releasing government-funded university research into the 
public domain, for example, would permit interested firms free access to the 
research to commercialize it.119 For many technologies competition is more 
effective than monopoly in spurring development; inventive concepts are 
nonrivalrous, allowing every interested firm to try their hands at developing 
downstream applications.120  
Some of the concerns about nanotech patents have been tempered 
already, however. For example, some critics suggest tightening the utility 
and patentable subject matter standards to restrict patenting of upstream 
research largely in reaction to the flood of biotechnology research patent 
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applications.121 The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in AMP v. Myriad122 
and Mayo v. Prometheus123 have done exactly that, increasing the likelihood 
that “discoveries” of naturally occurring materials or principles will be 
found unpatentable.124 The courts and the USPTO similarly have tightened 
the utility requirement to require “specific, substantial, and credible utility” 
as more than just an object of further research.125 Moreover, the patent 
system now also limits patentability by interpreting many patents in new 
technologies rather narrowly through both the enablement requirement and 
the written description requirement, the latter of which also is most often 
applied to narrow university-held biotechnology patents.126 And regardless, 
those who advocate for tightening patentability standards acknowledge that 
more stringent requirements will not completely solve any anticommons 
problem in nanotechnology, nor will it eliminate upstream research 
patenting.127 
Moreover, tightening patentability standards does little to address the 
other issues that may predispose nanotechnology and other fields to holdup 
problems with the increase in university patenting under Bayh-Dole. 
Commentators have therefore proposed various mechanisms to diminish the 
risk of anticommons and other obstacles. Some of these proposals, such as 
resurrecting an experimental-use exception in patent law128 and resurrecting 
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requirements and upstream university patenting under the Bayh-Dole Act, see Emily M. Morris, The 
Many Faces of Bayh-Dole, 54 DUQ. L. REV. 81, 117–18 (2016).  
128 E.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an 
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 470 (2004); Janice M. Mueller, No 
“Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical 
Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5, 9–10, 17 (2001) [hereinafter Mueller, Dilettante]; Mireles, supra 
note 47, at 276–77; see also Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1180–81, 1191, 1198, 1205 n.118 (2000) (proposing import into patent law of 
fair-use type of exemption similar to that in copyright law under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)). Patent law in 
the U.S. has, in modern times, reduced its experimental-use exception into near nonexistence. See Madey 
v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (concluding that no experimental-use exemption 
applies where research is the “legitimate business” of the alleged infringer); Janice M. Mueller, The 
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the reverse doctrine of equivalents,129 are designed to reduce transaction 
costs by removing the need to license upstream patents. Other proposals, 
such as less frequent injunctive relief,130 more accurate apportionment of 
damages,131 and limitations on treble damages for willful infringement,132 
seek to lessen the effect of royalty stacking by limiting infringement 
remedies. A third proposal, specific to Bayh-Dole, calls for the use of a 
funding agency’s “march-in” rights under the Act to grant, under certain 
circumstances, what are effectively compulsory licenses that allow third 
parties greater access to patented technologies.133 A similar proposal calls 
for government agencies to invoke their rights under the Act to disallow 
retention of patent rights by funding recipients in “exceptional 
circumstances” where it “will better promote the policy and objectives” of 
Bayh-Dole.134 Finally, private ordering may also help reduce transaction 
                                                                                                                          
Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications 
for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 918 (2004); Katherine 
J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
81, 99 (2004); Peter Lee, Note, Patents Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE 
L.J. 659, 683–84 (2004). The only substantial experimental-use exception that currently exists in patent 
law is the statutory exception limited to uses “reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary 
biological products.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). 
129 E.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1657–58; Dreyfuss, supra note 128, at 469. The reverse 
doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine that states that, even if an accused device falls within the 
literal meaning of a patent claim, no infringement liability will be found if the accused device “so far 
changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a 
substantially different way.” Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. 
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607, 608 (1950)). 
130 E.g., Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 102–20 
(2008); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 
B.C. L. REV. 149, 161, 166–67 (2007); Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1665–68. But see F. Scott 
Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 732–
36 (2001) (advocating for continued use of injunctive relief). 
131 E.g., Lemley, supra note 130, at 165–66. 
132 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology 
Transfer, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93, 113 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005); A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 
108–09; Lemley, supra note 130, at 164–65; Lemley, supra note 3, at 630; see also Mireles, supra note 
47, at 261 (discussing more robust research exemptions in the EU and Japan). 
133 Specifically, a funding government agency may force a funding recipient to grant nonexclusive 
or exclusive license to another under four circumstances: where the patentee is not expected to achieve 
“practical application” of the patented invention within “reasonable time;” where necessary to address 
health and safety needs; where necessary to meet requirements for public use specified under federal law; 
or to make sure that any manufacturing is substantially domestic. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(1)–(4) (2012); 
Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The 
Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving in 
Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631, 647 n.93, 648 (2001); Rai & 
Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 294. 
134 See e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 293, 303, 310 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 202 (a)(i)–
(ii)); see also Tullis, supra note 12, at 306 (discussing possibility of compulsory licensing under agencies’ 
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costs. Universities can join with other patent holders to form patent 
portfolios, patent pools, open-source pools, collective-rights organizations, 
or research and development consortia, all of which can simplify the process 
of gaining access to relevant patents.135 
In the end, however, all of these proposals to fix patent holdup problems 
in nanotechnology matter little if the seemingly slow development is not due 
to patenting, as a closer look at the technology strongly suggests. The next 
Section explores this possibility in more detail. 
III. THE STORY OF SCIENCE-BASED TECHNOLOGIES: THE IRRELEVANCE OF 
PATENTS 
Contrary to Professor Lemley’s assertion, nanotechnology may not be 
so different from other technologies that have also been affected by the 
Bayh-Dole Act. Many of the concerns voiced about nanotechnology patents 
are the same concerns that have been voiced about patents in other fields of 
university research. Patent floods, for example, have been seen in other new 
technologies such as molecular biology, superconductors, and petroleum 
refining, where scientific breakthroughs suddenly spur a rush of new 
opportunities.136 Patent floods, in turn, often breed poor patent quality, as the 
sheer volume of new patent applications strains the USPTO’s resources and 
low-quality and overlapping patents may lead to patent thickets.137 Indeed, 
patent thickets have been cropping up since long before the Bayh-Dole Act 
and the recent expansion of upstream research patenting by universities; 
thickets were a well-recognized issue in the sewing machine war of the 
1850s and in conflicts over airplane patents in the early 1900s, for 
example.138 More recently, biotech has seen similar complaints about overly 
broad patenting, poor patent quality, unpatentable subject matter, and high 
                                                                                                                          
§ 202(c)(4) right to “nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have 
practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention”) (citations omitted). 
135  See Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in 
Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 915–16 (2009) (giving examples of patent pools and open-source 
software); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1996) (suggesting that the law should 
allow “private collective rights organizations” to develop); Shapiro, supra note 72, at 119 (“Cross 
licenses and patent pools are two natural and effective methods used by market participants to cut through 
the patent thicket . . . .”); Lemley, supra note 3, at 623–27 (arguing that open licensing may be the solution 
to patent floods); Rai, supra note 69, at 845–46 (“[P]roperly designed cross-licensing and patent pooling 
arrangements can promote innovation markets.”). 
136 Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 907–08; Meurer, supra note 115, at 319, 324–25. 
137 Meurer, supra note 115, at 323–24; see also Adelman & DeAngelis supra note 67, at 1710–11 
(noting backlog of patent applications in complex technologies such as biotechnology). 
138 Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine 
War of the 1850s, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 165, passim (2011).   
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patent clearance costs.139  
In these and other ways, nanotech appears to be fairly typical of science-
based technologies, as this Section explains.140 There is therefore good 
reason to believe that at least some of future downstream nanotech 
development will follow in the footsteps of biotech development, where 
upstream patenting has turned out to be largely irrelevant. Rather, there are 
much more important obstacles than upstream patents to development in 
science-based fields such as biotechnology and nanotechnology: long 
development cycles; difficulties in attracting private investment; limited 
access to materials and equipment; high dependence on tacit knowledge; the 
low expected commercial values; multidisciplinarity; and likely regulatory 
hurdles. Science-based fields arise from university research, but even when 
present, access or lack of access to upstream university research patents 
often takes a back seat to other more salient characteristics of such 
technologies.  
A. Anticommons Require More Than Upstream Patenting 
As a first matter, the fact that universities hold such a high number of 
early-stage nanotechnology research patents is not by itself sufficient to 
cause either qualitative or quantitative holdup problems. Anticommons 
require more than just a large volume of patents. Patents vary a great deal in 
scope and importance,141 and of the small percentage that have commercial 
value, few will be important enough to create obstacles. Rather, the effect of 
a patent depends on a number of variables, and the effect of patenting under 
the Bayh-Dole Act therefore will vary greatly across and even within 
technologies and their developmental pathways.142 
To see this point, we can compare nanotechnology to biotechnology. As 
in nanotechnology, basic academic research and other government-funded 
research have played a large role in the development of biotechnology.143 
And like nanotech, biotech experienced a surge in university patenting after 
Bayh-Dole; universities currently hold about 18% of all patents in genetics 
                                                                                                                          
139 See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 65 (2008) (summarizing studies 
suggesting overabundance and poor quality of biotechnology patents); Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share 
Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 393, 438 n.280 (2006) (noting criticisms of USPTO’s evaluation of biotechnology patents). 
140 See, e.g., Ulrich Schmoch & Axel Thielmann, Cyclical Long-Term Development of Complex 
Technologies—Premature Expectations in Nanotechnology?, 21 RES. EVAL. 126, 126 (2012) 
(characterizing nanotechnology as a “science-based complex technology”). 
141 Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 67, at 1682. 
142 Brett M. Frischmann, Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic Perspectives: 
A View from the Demand Side, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 156–57 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005); Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 103, at 1584–87; Merges & Nelson, supra note 69, at 843. 
143 Bawa, supra note 3, at 722; Tullis, supra note 12, at 286–90. 
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and molecular biology.144 In fact, some observers suggest that as a science-
based field, nanotech now is following the same developmental trajectory 
that biotech charted about fifteen to twenty years ago.145 The trends seen in 
biotech can therefore be informative in studying development trends in 
nanotech.  
The empirical evidence thus far is equivocal at best as to whether the 
increase in university patenting has in fact either impeded or aided 
downstream development of university-based research as a whole,146 largely 
because of the difficulties of testing such a hypothesis.147 In biotech, 
however, the empirical data suggests that while anticommons and other 
holdup effects have affected specific fields such as genetics,148 biotech more 
generally does not suffer from significant holdup problems, whether 
qualitative or quantitative.149 Some studies suggest that biotechnological 
development and commercialization have in fact skyrocketed since the 
1980s.150  
The reasons for this surprising absence of evidence of holdup problems 
in biotech are manifold.151 First, researchers, especially those in academia, 
just ignore patents as a general rule.152 University researchers do not look at 
                                                                                                                          
144 Adelman, supra note 51, at 997 (although Adelman notes that biotech patenting levels overall 
may be declining); Lee, supra note 135, at 939–40. 
145 Frank T. Rothaermel & Marie Thursby, The Nanotech Versus the Biotech Revolution: Sources 
of Productivity in Incumbent Firm Research, 36 RES. POL’Y 832, 842 (2007); Michael R. Darby & Lynne 
G. Zucker, Grilichesian Breakthroughs: Inventions of Methods of Investing and Firm Entry in 
Nanotechnology 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9825, 2003), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9825 [https://perma.cc/RP29-2Y59]. 
146 Osenga, supra note 52, at 410; Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, Research Tool Patents 
After Integra v. Merck–Have They Reached a Safe Harbor?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 
387–88 (2008); Mireles, supra note 47, at 261, 274. 
147 See Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research 
and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Evidence to Date, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 435, 440, 475 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012) (giving 
examples of practical barriers to researching whether university patents inhibit innovation). 
148 See, e.g., Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical 
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 8 (2003); Jon F. Merz et al., Letter to the 
Editor, Industry Opposes Genomic Legislation, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 657 (2002). But see 
Andrew W. Torrance, Open Source Biotechnology: Open Source Human Evolution, 30 WASH. U.J.L. & 
POL’Y 93, 123 (2009) (pointing out that empirical evidence of anticommons due to gene patenting is 
scarce and that some empirical evidence in fact suggests the exact opposite). 
149 See, e.g., John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical 
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 289, 331 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen 
A. Merrill eds., 2003); Adelman, supra note 51, at 1023, 1028–29. 
150 See Kieff, supra note 130, at 725–26. 
151 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1063–75 (2008); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 Yale L.J. 177, 197–205 
(1987).  
152 Eisenberg, supra note 151, at 1076. 
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patents in selecting their topics and conducting research,153 and many report 
that they regularly use patented technologies in the belief that research is 
exempted from liability under an experimental-use exception.154 Although 
the Federal Circuit has held that no such experimental-use exception applies 
even to university research,155 research patent infringement is often too 
difficult to detect and police,156 particularly when it involves “problem-
specific” rather than foundational research, and in any event it is unlikely to 
be worth enough in damages to justify filing suit.157 Not surprisingly, patent 
holders have been ill disposed toward suing academic infringers,158 but 
universities may be reaching a point where they can no longer rely on 
effective immunity from suit for infringement. Universities have 
increasingly become the instigators and even targets of patent-enforcement 
threats,159 and with the growing view of universities as commercial actors, 
they have increasingly become the targets of patent enforcement as well.160 
A second, more specific, and perhaps more important reason why 
biotech has not experienced many hold ups is that biotech still offers so 
many research and development prospects that neither those in academia nor 
in private industry need bump into one another in order to research and 
develop their own patch of biotech.161 As Professor David Adelman has 
argued, the opportunities in biotech still far outnumber current research and 
development capacity, such that those in the field still have plenty of 
                                                                                                                          
153 See, e.g., John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCI. 
2002 (2005) (noting that only 5% of scientists surveyed regularly check for patents when conducting 
research). 
154 A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 72; Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 331. 
155 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also A PATENT SYSTEM, 
supra note 113, at 73, 76–77 (noting the effect of Madey). 
156 Lemley, supra note 3, at 623; Mireles, supra note 47, at 275–76 (and sources cited therein). 
157 Lemley, supra note 3, at 623; see also Victor H. Polk, Jr. & Roman Fayerberg, When Patented 
Technologies Get Put to Experimental Use: Practical Considerations for Nanotech R&D, 8 NANOTECH. 
L. & BUS. 152, 153–54 (2011) (noting that damage remedies may be muted, depending on the method of 
infringement). 
158 Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 326–27; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 700–01. 
159 See Christopher Brown, Ayresian Technology, Schumpeterian Innovation, and the Bayh-Dole 
Act, 43 J. ECON. ISSUES 477, 479 (2009) (“[U]niversities are heavily involved in patent litigation.”); A 
PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 73, 76–77; Lemley, supra note 3, at 622; see also Mueller, Dilettante, 
supra note 128, at 3–4 (describing Roche’s suit against more than forty U.S. universities and others for 
alleged infringement of patents on the use of “Taq” and PCR). 
160 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2183 (2009) 
(“[O]verpatenting by universities could lead to universities being treated more like commercial actors . . 
. .”); Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, passim (2013); Mireles, supra note 47, at 
275–76; Nelson, supra note 103, at 466. If the infringement occurs within public universities and research 
institutions, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Ed. Expense Bd. 
v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) may provide sovereign immunity from suit. BUREAU OF 
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 28, 59–60 (Aline C. Flower 
ed. 2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter BNA]; A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 78–79; Eisenberg, supra note 
151, at 1092. 
161 Adelman, supra note 51, at 998–99; Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 331–32. 
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freedom to operate within the biotech field.162 In those cases where 
researchers were deterred by the cost of licensing upstream patents, the 
researchers were easily able to redirect their research efforts to alternative 
strategies, given that most subject matter offered a range of research 
approaches.163 Similarly, patented processes and even research-method 
patents can often be circumvented if other processes for achieving the same 
result are available.164 Studies have shown that biotech firms and other 
researchers will often invent around patented research or use other research 
tools if any given project would require too many patent licenses.165 And 
although biotech has also seen a surge in overall patenting and in upstream 
patenting in particular,166 the concentration of patenting in any one subfield 
of biotech remains small.167 
Patent ownership also remains fairly diffuse, with no one entity able to 
exert much control over the field and few barriers to patenting and entry by 
newcomers.168 Diffuse patent ownership can lead to increased transaction 
costs, but in the case of biotech, the number of patents that have to be 
evaluated and negotiated for any given biotech project remains manageable 
and is rarely reported as an obstruction.169  
Without a similar mapping of nanotech-patenting patterns, it is difficult 
to tell whether nanotechnology also provides wide range of research 
avenues, but it seems likely. The youth of the field and its vast number of 
subfields suggest that nanotech is still wide open for exploration without fear 
of an anticommons.170 Again, the likelihood of upstream patenting deterring 
downstream development is a question of how important those upstream 
patents are. Much like biotech, nanotech is new enough and complex enough 
that, even with the high levels of patenting on upstream research that 
nanotech has already seen, many more research opportunities likely have yet 
                                                                                                                          
162 See Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 67, at 1699. 
163 Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 303; see also Adelman, supra note 51, at 1003–04 (noting that 
most diseases offer more potential research targets than there are available researchers). 
164 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Limiting the Role of Patents in Technology, 5 J. NIH RES. 20, 22 
(1993); see also A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 113, at 72 (noting that patents can be circumvented by 
inventing around them, using substitute research tools, and locating research activity offshore). 
165 Eisenberg, supra note 151, at 1064–65. 
166 Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 67, at 1687 (noting a decline in biotech patents issued as 
utility standards and USPTO resources tightened). 
167 Id. at 1701–02 (noting that most subclasses of biotechnology contained fewer than one hundred 
patents). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 1697 (citing Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 299–304); A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 
113, at 72. 
170 Cf. Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 67, at 1698–1700 (explaining how biotechnology’s 
relative youth continues to allow new avenues for exploration). 
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to be identified.171  
Likewise, although many basic nanomaterials such as carbon nanotubes, 
quantum dots, fullerenes, nanowires, dendrimers, and nanorods have been 
patented,172 it seems likely that useful additions and alternatives to these 
materials can be found in the near future. Organic nanotubes and polymer 
nanotubes, for example, can serve as alternatives to carbon nanotubes for 
many applications,173 and carbon nanotubes can be both synthesized and 
purified through a wide variety of alternative methods.174 Nanoscopic 
dendrimers also come in a huge variety of forms, including graphite-like 
dendrimers, dendrimers with cross-linked surfaces, hyper-branched 
dendrimers, and more.175 Most or all of these alternative nanotubes, 
dendrimers, and processes have been patented (and therefore could create 
patent thickets or other holdup issues),176 but their number and range 
demonstrate the breadth of the field and suggest that in nanotech, as in 
biotech, R&D opportunities far exceed capacity and that nanotech is thus 
also “an effectively unbounded, uncongested common resource.”177  
A few critical patents may be important enough, however, that despite 
their relatively small number, restricted access to these patents could create 
bottlenecks.178 Many technologies rely on a few pivotal research tools to 
enable further research and development;179 without these foundational 
inventions, further progress in their respective fields would be difficult or 
impossible.180 Although very few upstream research patents fall within this 
                                                                                                                          
171 David E. Adelman, The Irrationality of Speculative Gene Patents, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE 
STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION & ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
& TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 125 (Gary D. Libecap ed. 2005). 
172 Lemley, supra note 3, at 613–14; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 86, 96. 
173 Michael Lounsbury et al., The Politics of Neglect: Path Selection and Development in 
Nanotechnology Innovation, in 21 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION & 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 51 (Gary D. 
Libecap ed. 2010). The fact that carbon nanotubes have become the better-known form is more a matter 
of “technological momentum” than importance to the field. Id. 
174 M. Henry Heines, Carbon Nanotubes: Tracing Growth of a Young Technology Through Patents, 
7 NANOTECHNOLOGY. L. & BUS. 21, 26–30 (2010) (“The impact of these synthesis patents is further 
lessened by the existence of a variety of [carbon nanotube] synthesis methods, presenting the 
manufacturer with a host of alternatives for avoiding infringement of a single patent.”). 
175 Alexander Lee, Examining the Viability of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotechnology Patent 
Thicket, 3 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 317, 321–22 (2006). 
176 See, e.g., id. at 323 (describing dendrimers as being subject to patent thickets). 
177 Adelman, supra note 51, at 987; cf. id. (discussing why biotech has not suffered from 
anticommons). 
178 Walsh et al., supra note 149, at 305–06. 
179 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 130, at 86–91. 
180 Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 917, 928, 932 (2005); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 257, 268–69 (2007); Lee, supra note 130, at 89–91. Foundational inventions have also been 
referred to variously as “common-method research tools,” Adelman, supra note 171, at 139, “platform 
technologies,” McManis & Noh, supra note 147, at 485, or even “Grilichesian breakthroughs,” Darby & 
Zucker, supra note 145, at 1–2 (citing Zvi Griliches, Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of 
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category,181 exclusive rights over foundational tools obviously can stifle 
development and competition within a field.182 Evidence suggests that 
foundational research tools are frequently dedicated to the public domain, 
however.183 
Although nanotubes and other nanomaterials have been referred to as 
the “basic building blocks,”184 nanotechnology’s true foundational tool is 
probe microscopy; without probe microscopy, nanotechnology could not 
have become anything more than an interesting theory.185 Nobel Prize-
winning physicist Richard Feynman first suggested the idea of manipulating 
individual atoms in 1959, but it was not until the invention of the scanning 
tunneling microscope in 1981 that scientists could actually visualize matter 
at a high enough magnitude to begin to construct materials atom by atom.186 
The scanning tunneling microscope was followed by the invention of the 
atomic force microscope in 1989, which became commercially available 
shortly thereafter and proved to be superior to the scanning tunneling 
version.187 Subsequent iterations on probe microscopy have also yielded the 
magnetic force microscope and the near-field scanning optical 
microscope.188 Because nanotechnology could not exist without probe 
microscopy, patent rights on these foundational research tools could pose a 
risk to nanotech development. 
According to Professor Lemley, nanotech is nevertheless different from 
other pioneering technologies like computers, biotech, integrated circuits, 
and lasers; although these fields experienced patent floods after Bayh-Dole, 
Lemley claims that those patents covered mainly downstream applications 
or improvements, not foundational technologies.189 Instead, according to 
Lemley, the foundational tools in this latter group of technologies were 
                                                                                                                          
Technological Change, 25 ECONOMETRICA 501, 501 (1957)). 
181 Adelman, supra note 51, at 1020; Adelman, supra note 171, at 139; McManis & Noh, supra 
note 147, at 486. 
182 Nelson, supra note 103, at 464. 
183 Adelman, supra note 51, at 997–1001; Adelman, supra note 171, at 140; Walsh et al., supra 
note 149, at 324–29. 
184 Lemley, supra note 3, at 613–14; Reynolds, supra note 1, at 86. 
185 See MONICA, supra note 2, § 1:1 (“Most important to the development of nanotechnology [were] 
. . . entirely new forms of electron microscopes . . . .”); Zovko, supra note 64, at 156 (“[T]echniques such 
as scanning probe microscopy are essential for manipulating atoms and arranging them in particular 
molecular configurations . . . . If scanning probe microscopy, carbon nanotubes, or similar fundamental 
tools are unavailable to research and development entities through purchase or license from patent 
owners, the scientific progress of nanotechnology will be stifled.”); Darby & Zucker, supra note 145, at 
13–14. 
186 MONICA, supra note 2, § 1:1.  
187 Cyrus M. Mody, Corporations, Universities, and Instrumental Communities: Commercializing 
Probe Microscopy, 1981-1996, 47 TECH. & CULTURE 56, 68–69 (2006); Rothaermel & Thursby, supra 
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unpatented, freely licensed, or tied up in interference proceedings and 
litigation for so long that they were effectively unenforceable.190 In 
nanotechnology, by contrast, patents cover all but a very few foundational 
building blocks, making holdup problems much more likely than in previous 
technologies.191 
Again, however, whether nanotech is truly different from biotech or 
other technologies is a matter for debate for a number of reasons. First, many 
of the basic nanotech building blocks to which Lemley refers are not truly 
pivotal, even though they may be basic. Again, carbon nanotubes and even 
quantum dots, fullerenes, nanowires, dendrimers, and nanorods may be basic 
in the sense that they can be incorporated into a vast variety of downstream 
applications,192 but because meaningful substitutes likely can be found, these 
materials may not pose as great a holdup risk as Lemley suggests.  
Second, to the extent that its development has been stifled by patents on 
foundational research tools like probe microscopy, nanotech is not as unique 
as Lemley would suggest. Contrary to Lemley’s assertion otherwise, some 
studies suggest that biotech research has in fact experienced holdup 
effects.193 Although Cohen and Boyer liberally granted inexpensive, 
nonexclusive licenses to their patented recombinant DNA technology,194 
foundational research tools such as Cetus Corporation’s polymerase chain-
reaction technology, Harvard’s OncoMouse, and the University of 
Wisconsin’s human embryonic stem cell technology are thought to have 
hampered progress in biotechnology because of the patent holders’ 
restrictive licensing practices.195 Thus, although foundational 
nanotechnology research tools have been patented, it is likely that 
development in this field is not significantly different from the other science-
based technologies that have preceded it.  
Third, even foundational technologies become less foundational as 
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newly invented alternatives supplement or replace earlier technologies,196 as 
illustrated by the multiple forms of probe microscopy that have become 
available in nanotechnology.197 Although probe microscopes are not 
perfectly interchangeable substitutes for one another, the progression from 
scanning tunneling microscope to atomic force microscope and beyond does 
at least illustrate the shift in technological bottlenecks over time.198  
B. Obstacles to Development in Science-Based Technologies 
Besides patents, nanotechnology faces a number of other, more 
significant hurdles common in science-based technologies. “Science-based” 
technologies such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, also known as 
“research-based” technologies, derive not from practical experience in 
industrial design and production but instead from the academic pursuit of 
knowledge for the sake of knowledge, which may then only later have 
practical application.199 As Professor Liza Vertinsky has explained, science-
based technologies are “knowledge-intensive”200 and driven primarily by 
basic research and scientific breakthroughs outside the norm of private 
industry.201 And because inventions in science-based fields such as 
nanotechnology are typically in no more than proof-of-concept form, they 
are high in development costs and investment risk but low in expected 
market value.202 Commercializing technologies still in such early and risky 
stages of development is well beyond the comfort zone of most private 
investors.203 The difficulties inherent to science-based technology 
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development are thus much more likely than patents to slow development in 
these embryonic fields, which are especially prone to suffer from 
underdevelopment.204 
Much of the early optimism about pioneering new technologies such as 
biotech and nanotech and discussion about the effect of patenting in these 
fields overlook the significant nonpatent obstacles, however, which can 
often prove to be insurmountable.205 Very little of the research in these fields 
and other government-funded research areas is even worth patenting, 
presumably because of the same lack of commercial value that made it 
dependent on government funding.206 Universities must be highly selective 
in using their limited resources to patent faculty research, and university 
TTOs usually will avoid the high costs of obtaining patent protection unless 
industry expresses an interest in a particular technology.207 Even when 
universities do decide to assume the cost of obtaining a patent, very few of 
those patents earn any profit.208 
Thus, although development of some of the more straightforward 
nanotechnology applications may be less difficult, much if not most of the 
field seems to be as yet in a more inchoate state, requiring many additional 
developmental stages before commercialization can be achieved. Delays or 
even failure can occur at any one of these stages for any number of reasons. 
The following are some of the main reasons why much of nanotechnology 
as science-based technology is so challenging to commercialize. 
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1. Long Development Cycles  
First and most significant is the fact that commercializing science-based 
technologies requires a good deal of further experimentation and work; 
regardless of patent burdens, it is simply a laborious and slow process to 
develop basic research and “bridge the gap from the laboratory to the 
marketplace.”209 Science-based technologies often explore pioneering new 
areas well outside existing art but consequently require far more downstream 
development than other technologies.210 Having been invented by scientists 
rather than business people, emerging technologies do not come out of the 
laboratory in ready-to-market form,211 and even patentable inventions in 
these fields typically require several additional stages of development.212 
Taking research-intensive technologies from laboratory proofs of concept to 
industrial practice necessitates perfecting the invention so that it will 
perform reliably and can be reproduced in a cost-efficient manner.213 For 
example, producing even basic nanotechnology building blocks such as 
nanotubes, metal oxide nanoparticles, and fullerenes in consistently high-
quality form, took quite some time.214 Each of these additional steps may 
also be complex and time-consuming, making overall commercialization 
quite lengthy. Long development cycles and time lags are therefore common 
in research-intensive fields such as physics, mathematics, and the physical 
sciences,215 and nanotechnology has proven to be no exception, with long 
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development spans frequently delaying commercialization.216 
Commercializing research-based technologies often entails 
development of new equipment and new materials as well. Translating 
scientific knowledge into industrial application generally involves 
implementation through one of the applied sciences such as engineering, 
information technology, or materials science.217 The more pioneering these 
technologies are and the more widespread their effects, the more their 
successful commercialization will depend on separate scientific and 
technological developments in infrastructure such as machinery and 
processes, as well as correlative technologies such as supporting software 
and information technology.218 In nanotechnology, for example, the need to 
develop secondary equipment and processes may be particularly acute, 
given the cross-disciplinary nature of nanotechnology and the need to adapt 
it to specific sectors.219  
The technological translation process may also depend on the cost and 
availability of existing material assets and machinery.220 Probe microscopy 
development, for example, has been heavily influenced by what materials 
were cheaply and easily available at the time.221 When academic researchers 
were working on improving the STM for their own uses, they opted for 
graphite because it happened to be cheaply available as waste material from 
United Carbide.222 Similar material availability issues also shaped the 
divergent development efforts by STM researchers working in different 
locations.223 And even now, lack of access to high quality and reliably 
reproducible and manufacturable nanomaterials continues to be a stumbling 
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block for nanotech development224 because materials such as carbon 
nanotubes and dendritic molecules are rate-limitingly expensive and 
difficult to find in sufficiently high quantities and quality.225 Access to 
materials or research materials can be restrictive in other fields as well; for 
example, in biofuels the production cost of enzymes and ethanologens is a 
significant barrier to research.226 Similarly, the fixed capital costs of 
retooling or buying new machinery can be prohibitively burdensome.227 
Nanotechnology depends on access to probe microscopes, nanofabrication 
equipment, modeling software, and other essential but often proscriptively 
costly tools.228 For example, faster drying, more efficient autobody 
nanocoatings have been available for some time now, but the cost of 
retooling has kept the cash-strapped automobile industry from taking 
advantage of the new technology.229  
Given the extreme length of development cycles in science-based 
technologies, then, those engaged in the commercialization process often 
simply ignore potential clashes with the patent rights of others, and 
rationally so.230 Even when they receive cease-and-desist letters threatening 
legal action for patent infringement, emerging technology developers know 
that litigation to enforce patent rights is often more costly than it is worth.231 
In addition, patent holders usually will refrain from filing suit until an 
infringing development project produces something of enough commercial 
value to warrant the bother, but given the high failure rates in research-
intensive technologies, threatening patent holders seldom actually file.232 
Litigation always poses a risk for the patent holders as well, as even the 
strongest patents may be subject to invalidation in whole or in part.233 And 
if the critics are correct, filing infringement suits in science-based 
technologies may be particularly fraught with danger, as upstream patents 
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are particularly vulnerable to invalidation for lack of specific and substantial 
utility, failure to claim patentable subject matter, and, especially in 
nanotechnology, inherency or obviousness.234  
Finally, development cycles may also span so many years that patents 
on foundational or other potentially blocking upstream research inputs often 
will expire in the interim.235 Patents on many of the basic nanotech building 
blocks, such as those on carbon nanotubes, buckyballs, quantum dots, 
dendrimers, and nanorods, for example, have already expired or are due to 
expire in the very near future,236 and foundational inventions in particular 
may be used through several development cycles, such that their patents 
expire long before their utility does.237 Thus, by the time science-based 
technologies finally achieve commercialization, many patents will no longer 
be in effect.238 As a result, upstream patenting’s capacity to exert holdup 
effects is rather low in these technologies.  
2. The Valley of Death 
The technological difficulties of commercializing science-based 
technologies bring economic difficulties as well. Again, commercialization 
of research-intensive technologies is usually an expensive, risky, multistage 
undertaking. The government will invest in the basic research stages, but 
private investors prefer to wait and invest only in the very last stages of 
development; private firms and investors generally favor development 
projects closer to completion so as to minimize risk and maximize the time-
value of their funds.239 The long, expensive, and uncertain development 
stages in between the early, basic research stage and the final, marketing 
stage are consequently left to languish for lack of investment.240 Indeed, 
many scholars note that it is government funding of basic research that 
“causes” the valley of death because the government tends to subsidize 
exactly the kind of basic research in which private industry is unwilling to 
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assume the risk.241 Development of many otherwise valuable science-based 
inventions never attain commercialization because of lack of funding for the 
intermediate stages of development in what has been termed the “Valley of 
Death.”242 
Private investors are reluctant to fund the intermediate stages of 
technology development for a variety of reasons, many of which are the 
same reasons that they do not invest in early-stage, basic research. Other 
things being equal, the more rapidly an investment yields returns the more 
likely investors are to invest, but research-intensive technologies do not lead 
to the kind of rapid innovation that can yield the immediate returns that 
investors want.243 Instead, science-based technologies still in the early and 
even intermediate stages of development take too many years to yield 
returns, if they in fact yield any returns at all.244 Much of the current 
development in nanotechnology, for example, commonly requires twice the 
time needed for commercialization in other venture-capital supported 
technologies245 and is well beyond the accepted investment timetables of 
private industry.246 Plus, the longer the development cycle, the more costly 
it is likely to be, making development even more unattractive as an 
investment.247 
And it is not just the length of development cycles but also the 
uncertainty and risk inherent in science-based technologies that deter 
investment in the intermediate stages of development. Commercialization of 
basic research is a painstaking process of trial and error,248 and university-
initiated inventions in particular experience higher failure rates than private 
firm-initiated inventions, with up to half of university inventions failing 
during commercialization.249 In addition to the technological uncertainties 
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already mentioned, commercializing science-based inventions also involves 
the business uncertainties of defining markets and market demand.250 
Technological difficulties account for only about half of the failure rate 
among university inventions, with the remainder failing due to the business 
difficulties of identifying market opportunities for university inventions 
whose ultimate applications so frequently differ from what was expected 
during the early stages of commercialization.251 Nanotechnology again has 
proven to be no exception, with both technological and marketing 
difficulties leading to high failure rates during commercialization efforts.252  
Considering the time and expense involved and their minimal capacity 
even to assess risk, investors are understandably risk averse. The 
information gaps between inventing research scientists and investors are 
significant,253 and few private investors can afford the fixed capital costs of 
acquiring the expertise necessary to assess the risks.254 The intermediate 
stages of development are thus in many ways the most critical because they 
are the stages that resolve much of the technological and business 
uncertainty of commercialization.255 Only once intermediate-stage 
development is complete, these uncertainties resolved, and a valid 
commercial plan proven are private investors willing to become involved.256 
In this way the valley of death and the information gap between private 
interests and university researchers can create greater obstacles to 
downstream development than patents do. The difficulties of attracting 
investment in technologies with long and uncertain development cycles are 
often a more intractable problem than is the need to license upstream or 
complementary patents. As a matter of fact, identifying downstream firms 
to develop university research is one of the most difficult obstacles for 
technology transfer offices to overcome.257  
Some private investors such as angel and seed investors specialize in 
early- and intermediate-stage development, however.258 Indeed, a few angel 
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investment companies, such as the Nano Business Angels network and the 
Central Coast Angel Network, have come to specialize in nanotech 
specifically.259 Over time other venture capitalists and other potential 
investors will become less reluctant to invest in new technologies such as 
nanotechnology as investors develop expertise in and a level of comfort with 
the technologies and the technologies themselves mature, such that the 
perceived risk of investment attenuates.260 Venture capital’s interests in 
nanotechnology, for example, have waxed and waned over the years,261 and 
venture capitalists have constituted only a small minority of overall funding 
of nanotechnology research for the past couple of decades.262 Only once 
revenue streams from nanotechnology-based products finally began to grow 
in recent years did private industry funding for nanotechnology R&D finally 
begin to overtake government funding.263 
Because of private capital’s wariness of emerging technologies, 
development projects that are too uncertain and risky to attract private 
funding can obtain government funding from several federal agencies.264 
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program enacted in 1982, 
for example, allows federal agencies to grant funds to small businesses for 
the commercialization of government-sponsored R&D.265 A number of 
agencies that fund nanotechnology basic research also issue SBIR grants, 
and the National Institutes of Health have even implemented a 
Bioengineering Nanotechnology Initiative to grant SBIR funds for 
biomedical nanotech projects.266 The Small Business Technology Transfer 
(STTR) subpart of SBIR also funds collaborations between private industry 
and nonprofit educational and research facilities.267 In the late 1980s, 
Congress also created the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) to provide 
matching funds for private investments in early-stage technological 
developments that face significant risk but are likely to yield significant and 
wide-ranging benefits.268 Overall, government funding steps in to provide 
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about 20% to 25% of all funds for early-stage technology development,269 
with state governments also increasingly providing public funds for the same 
purposes, such as funding university start-ups.270 Nanotechnology 
companies can also apply for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
grants for high-risk projects that offer advances in military preparedness.271 
3. Limitations on Equipment and Materials 
Furthermore, constraints on access to the necessary tools and materials 
as well as skills raise imitation costs in a way that makes patent protections 
largely inconsequential and even unnecessary in science-based 
technologies.272 Private control over relevant research facilities and 
materials, for example, create nonpatent exclusivities affecting downstream 
development. Not just industry but also universities are often perceived as 
being quite proprietary over their materials and instruments, particularly 
biotech materials, and frequently do not allow the public free access to their 
research materials and tools.273 In point of fact, a survey of biotech 
researchers documents that the need to negotiate access to necessary 
materials such as cell lines was a more limiting factor than upstream 
patents.274 And even when they do agree to share materials and equipment, 
universities often employ materials-transfer agreements that include reach-
through royalty provisions or other restrictive conditions such as limits 
patenting to downstream products.275  
Of course, proprietary university policies on sharing research materials 
may be a part of an overall shift toward less liberal sharing caused by Bayh-
Dole’s emphasis on university ownership of their research. Universities may 
feel that they need to be more protective of their research materials and tools 
as a way of simultaneously protecting their research patents,276 for instance, 
or universities may be forced to be more possessive of their materials 
because of the restrictions imposed under industry-sponsored research 
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agreements relying on the expectation of university patent ownership under 
Bayh-Dole.277 On the other hand, universities may be protective simply 
because producing research materials and tools requires effort and 
investment and because those materials and tools help universities establish 
a competitive edge as leading research institutions.278 Regardless of the 
motivation, however, the fact stands that exclusive access to research 
materials and tools is a more significant problem in technology 
commercialization efforts than patents are.279 
One method that has been used to address the holdup problems created 
by the need for research materials is to standardize materials-transfer 
agreements, at least as between equally situated research institutions such as 
universities, as proposed by the NIH and endorsed by the AUTM for use in 
the transfer of biotechnology research materials.280 This effort fell somewhat 
flat, however, as universities often may continue to place their economic 
self-interest over Mertonian norms and social welfare.281 
Universities have, however, begun to set up technology incubators and 
research and science parks to house both university- and industry-based 
start-ups; to facilitate closer relationships between universities and private 
industry for joint projects, consultation, and other endeavors; and to provide 
access to research materials and tools.282 Industry- and university-based 
“precompetitive” research and development consortia have also recently 
evolved to share research and development resources, such as research tools, 
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materials, and even data.283 These precompetitive consortia are probably the 
most effective means of providing public access to otherwise proprietary 
materials, as the consortia allow multiple downstream developers to share 
foundational resources. Such precompetitive consortia are difficult to 
organize, however, and face steep transaction costs that may require 
governmental intervention, or changes in relevant law, to overcome.284 
4. Tacit Knowledge 
Moreover, limited access to research materials and tools is not the only 
type of nonpatent exclusivity that can obstruct downstream development. 
Another form of effective exclusivity is tacit knowledge, a phenomenon 
common in fields such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, where 
university research can lead to such major advances over the prior art that 
learning curves become too steep for others in the field to be able to acquire 
the necessary expertise.285 As a result, the knowledge and skills necessary 
for downstream development in the field remain concentrated in the hands 
of just a few researchers and impose an unavoidable limit on downstream 
development that often eclipses other types of exclusivity, including both 
patent protection and first-mover advantages.286 
First, commercialization of most university research, whether or not 
patented, requires the participation of the inventing researcher. Estimates 
indicate that somewhere between 40% and 71% of licensed university 
research requires faculty involvement to be successfully commercialized.287 
Even genetics remained dependent on tacit knowledge for decades after 
Cohen & Boyer’s seminal invention of recombinant DNA technology.288 
Nanotechnology also remains highly knowledge-intensive, such that success 
in the field is limited to firms with access to researchers with the requisite 
specialized skills in the area.289  
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For example, tacit knowledge was a significant factor in the 
development of the scanning tunneling microscope and the atomic force 
microscope, two of the foundational research tools through which the entire 
field of nanotechnology even became possible.290 Invented by IBM 
employees Heini Rohrer and Gerd Binnig in 1979, the STM was at first a 
commercially valueless dud in which IBM lost interest.291 Rohrer and Binnig 
did not want their brainchild to fall into oblivion, however, so they cultivated 
a select few academic researchers from a variety of disciplines who were 
interested in using the STM for basic research.292 This core group of STM 
enthusiasts struggled for years to acquire enough of Binnig and Rohrer’s 
expertise to replicate the microscope.293 Only once a critical mass of 
enthusiasts finally had the expertise to construct STMs on their own and to 
spark the interests of their home institutions in the research benefits of these 
new devices did IBM decide to begin commercial STM production in the 
late 1980s.294 Even then, for the first five years or so after they were 
invented, scanning tunneling and atomic-force microscopes were accessible 
only to those with the resources and skills necessary to construct the 
microscopes on their own.295 Moreover, the facilities that invested in STMs 
still had to train someone to use the microscopes, given that the simple act 
of using an STM continued to require some degree of expertise and tacit 
knowledge for decades.296  
Second, faculty involvement is often crucial to locating licensees for 
university research. A researcher’s tacit knowledge can be important to 
bridging the information gaps between investors and researchers that 
contribute to valley-of-death issues and can help to inspire investor 
confidence by establishing a researcher’s reputation and status.297 In fact, 
potential licensees are often identified only through a faculty researcher’s 
contacts with industry players298 and through personal relationships rather 
than arm’s-length marketing.299  
Of course, like patent protection, first-mover advantages, and other 
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types of exclusivity, tacit knowledge is time-limited; tacit knowledge can 
remain tacit for only so long. As understanding of an emerging technology 
matures and spreads, others will gain access to the technology. Exactly how 
long any such tacit knowledge might provide some sort of exclusivity in 
nanotech development is an open question and likely depends on the 
particular development at issue, but that being said, at least one study by 
economists strongly suggests that the duration of nonpatent exclusivity 
based on tacit knowledge and access to research tools was twice as long in 
biotech as in nanotech.300 
While tacit knowledge and other natural exclusivities over university 
research continue to be in force, however, it is not surprising that 
commercialization efforts in science-based technologies tend to concentrate 
geographically around university faculty with the requisite expertise and 
materials.301 Geographic collocation has the advantage of allowing hands-
on participation by faculty members or others with pivotal tacit knowledge, 
access to university technology incubators and research parks, and 
collaboration or even acquisition of university-initiated start-up companies.  
Indeed, in the last three decades or so, universities have begun to license 
their upstream research patents to start-up companies at increasing rates.302 
University start-ups could help solve some of the nonpatent problems in 
developing upstream research.303 For example, start-ups may help both 
transfer tacit knowledge and provide access to research tools and materials. 
Faculty researchers and their graduate students commonly are active parts 
of university-based start-ups and have become increasingly active 
participants in private industry more generally, as research scientists now 
commonly move between universities and industry and private firms host 
postdoctoral fellows.304 The tacit knowledge these students and faculty 
researchers possess continues to be exclusive to them,305 of course, until such 
time that understanding of the underlying technology matures and spreads 
and becomes less tacit over time.306 Nonetheless, faculty involvement in 
start-ups and other private enterprises does at least provide a conduit by 
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which tacit knowledge can be transferred to the commercial sector. 
Likewise, to the extent that university-based start-ups make use of university 
research tools and materials, start-ups can provide the commercial sector 
with at least some, albeit limited, access to tools and materials over which 
the university might exert proprietary rights. 
To a lesser extent, start-ups may also help bridge the valley of death. 
Although larger or at least established firms might have more expertise in 
commercializing and marketing generally,307 start-ups offer their own 
advantages.308 University start-ups generally are more nimble and less risk-
averse than not only universities but also larger, more established firms.309 
Unlike their parent universities, moreover, university-based start-ups are 
designed to be commercial entities that presumably will have the kinds of 
market orientations that universities lack while also avoiding the 
bureaucracy of university administrations and constituencies. And to the 
extent that they are funded through alternatives to private investment, 
university start-ups represent an intermediate (and separately funded and 
executed) step between upstream research and marketable downstream 
applications.310 Start-ups work on the intermediate development stages, 
making commercialization less risky and more attractive to private 
investors. And although only a small percentage of licensed university 
research is introduced through start-ups rather than through more established 
firms,311 university-based start-ups are by far the most common way for new 
nanotechnology businesses to get their start;312 most nanotech companies 
today are university-based start-ups.313 
5. Multidisciplinarity and Personnel 
One of the most exciting aspects of nanotechnology is its potential to 
revolutionize an amazingly wide variety of technological and scientific 
fields. As noted above, however, this cross-industry potential is also one of 
nanotechnology development’s potential drawbacks, although not for the 
reasons that Professor Lemley and others have posited. Development in 
multidisciplinary fields involves not just the need to coordinate patents and 
other legal rights but also the need to coordinate technological expertise 
from among the relevant fields.314 Although mixing disciplines can create 
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new paradigms that spur innovation, such “intellectual migration” is not 
without its own transaction costs and uncertainty, completely independent 
of patent rights or their distribution.315  
That is to say, “nanotechnologists” do not simply appear out of thin air. 
Nanotechnologists instead must be developed from other disciplines with 
other technological paradigms.316 Like some other pioneering new 
technologies, nanotechnology was born of parallel but independent tracks of 
research in various fields. For instance, someone who started out as a 
materials scientist may create a nanotech advance with promising 
implications for medical research. To develop the invention further, the 
materials scientist will need to collaborate with an expert in medicine, 
biotechnology, or other fields, however, and the transaction costs of 
identifying and coordinating with others from different fields to collaborate 
on a new project can be steep. And even then, many factors create significant 
social barriers to the multidisciplinary cooperation necessary to design 
usable nanotechnology end products; institutional differences, lack of 
interdisciplinary standards and protocols, peer and institutional support, and 
other infrastructure, and even cultural differences between disciplines and 
the “inertia of disciplinary tradition,” all can create a drag on the 
development process.317 In these and other ways, the sociological aspects of 
technology development and any attendant “culture shock” may slow 
commercialization. 
Perhaps because of nanotechnology’s multidisciplinary nature and the 
need to unite specialists from many different areas, the majority of federal 
funding in nanotechnology thus far has been through government research 
laboratories rather than through university or private research facilities and 
thus falls under the provisions of the Stevenson-Wydler Act rather than 
Bayh-Dole.318 The Stevenson-Wydler Act allows government-operated 
laboratories to enter into cooperative research and development agreements 
(CRADAs) with private contractors and to license, exclusively or 
nonexclusively, or even to assign title to, any resulting patents.319 In this 
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regard, CRADAs are effectively cost-sharing agreements, with the 
government contributing access to government equipment, facilities, and 
personnel rather than research funds.320 The most relevant virtue of 
CRADAs, moreover, is that they can pool the expertise of federal laboratory 
researchers and private researchers from among a variety of disciplines—a 
point particularly important to multidisciplinary areas such as 
nanotechnology research.321  
The federal government has also used public funds to establish other 
types of research centers that can help solve many of the problems of 
science-based technology development.322 One such center devoted 
specifically to nanotechnology development is the Nanotechnology 
Characterization Laboratory (NCL) at the National Cancer Institute, a 
federally funded laboratory created as a collaborative effort among 
pharmaceutical companies, university researchers, and government agencies 
to offer free molecule-characterization services to universities and industrial 
nanodrug developers working in translational medicine.323 The NCL thus 
serves not only to standardize the metrics for nanoparticle characterization 
but also to collect the necessary expertise from diverse institutions and 
disciplines, including biologists, chemists, toxicologists, immunologists, 
pathologists, technicians, and biomedical and chemical engineers, thus 
helping to overcome interdisciplinary gaps.324 The NCL has the further 
advantage of helping to usher nanodrugs through the riskier intermediate 
development stages and to make those drugs more attractive to private 
investors.325 Finally, the NCL is also a noncommercial organization that 
produces no scientific publications or intellectual property but is nonetheless 
more commercially oriented and flexible than any university could be.326 
One unique and perhaps more significant aspect of nanotechnology that 
may be slowing down its development, according to nanotech expert Eric 
Drexler, is that government, private investors, and even scientists 
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themselves still do not fully appreciate what a true nanotechnology 
revolution would mean.327 According to Drexler, the real definition of 
nanotechnology is a radical and comprehensive transformation in how things 
are manufactured, or what Drexler terms “atomically precise 
manufacturing” (APM).328 Although closely related, the diffuse and largely 
piecemeal innovations that society currently identifies as nanotechnology 
have distracted from the bigger picture of what nanotechnology can offer 
and delayed realization of this promise as a result.329 
Specifically, Drexler argues that although development efforts in 
nanotechnology thus far have led to the fabrication of new materials that 
exploit the unique phenomenon occurring at the nanoscopic level,330 these 
advances have led mostly to use of the new nanomaterials as incremental 
improvements to existing technologies rather than fundamental changes in 
manufacturing methods or APM.331 As one science historian put it, 
nanotechnology “consists of different, largely ‘mono-disciplinary fields’ 
which are rather unrelated to each other and which hardly share more than 
the “nano” prefix.”332 Drexler contends that nanotechnology is not just about 
improving existing technologies, however, but rather about the profound 
change in manufacturing globally that would come from APM.333 Although 
a more scientific explanation of APM is obviously beyond the scope of the 
discussion here, atomically precise manufacturing is in many ways 
analogous to 3D printing or intracellular protein synthesis in that APM 
allows fabrication of an infinite variety of materials and objects through 
meticulous, sequential assembly of individual molecules of common 
elements.334 Atomically precise manufacturing allows less expensive, 
environmentally cleaner, and thus “ultra-efficient” industrial-level 
production to take place not just in factories but also on desktops or 
anywhere else.335 Atomically precise manufacturing will revolutionize 
fabrication processes because APM uses less raw material to create objects 
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that are stronger and yet lighter, thereby reducing both shipping costs and 
energy costs.336 It is perhaps this kind of technologically brave new world 
that many predicted nanotechnology would bring and that critics worry that 
the Bayh-Dole Act has helped stymy.  
And in fact, progress in APM has not been as rapid as Drexler and others 
had hoped,337 but Drexler attributes the logjam to a lack of investment and 
focus, not to upstream patenting.338 APM does exist to a limited extent in 
some isolated fields, but systemic changes in manufacturing technologies 
have yet to emerge.339 According to Drexler, this is due in part to the fact 
that nanotechnology development continues to be scattered among divergent 
scientific disciplines, a cohesive vision of APM is still lacking.340 
Government agencies and other investors have focused instead on the 
development of nanoparticles and other lower hanging fruit with more 
readily attainable and yet less impressive returns.341 
6. Safety Fears 
A different risk that some nanotechnology enthusiasts mention as a 
problem for nanotech development is the health, environmental, and other 
dangers that nanotech applications may pose. Nanotechnology’s relative 
unfamiliarity has provoked the same kinds of fears that have beset research 
in other research-based fields such as pharmaceuticals, genetically modified 
organisms, cloning, and human embryonic stem cells.342 And because 
nanotech is such a uniquely cross-disciplinary area of research, it has 
applications and therefore potential safety ramifications in a number of 
heavily regulated fields.343 In fact, to avoid triggering governmental 
regulatory review or public apprehension, some companies may try to keep 
their products “below the radar” by failing to identify products containing 
nanomaterials.344 More importantly, concerns about possible regulatory 
barriers have also dampened investment in nanotech development: the 
specter of regulatory restrictions and potential liability for consumer, 
environmental, or other harms create additional uncertainties that yet further 
                                                                                                                          
336 Id. at 162–63. 
337 Id. at 195. 
338 Id. at 178. 
339 See ROADMAP, supra note 334, at v, 4 (listing technologies using living tissue and scanning 
probe manipulation on crystal surfaces as examples of currently employed APM). 
340 DREXLER, supra note 201, at 121. 
341 Id. at 178, 195. 
342 See SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 20, at 203; Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and 
Private Interests in the Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical Research: Is There a Role for 
Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 127–28 (2007); Gary E. 
Marchant et al., What Does the History of Technology Regulation Teach Us About Nano Oversight?, 37 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 724, 727–28 (2009) (noting that society often has strong social and ethical concerns 
about emerging technologies such as nanotechnology). 
343 Marchant, supra note 342, at 724. 
344 Wolfe, supra note 37. 
 
 546 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:499 
deter private and even government funding in nanotech R&D.345 Public fears 
about nanotechnology have also negatively influenced enthusiasm for the 
field, and therefore its success.346 
Some of the health and environmental concerns about nanotechnology 
are well-founded. Graphene particles, for example, may present some risk 
of respiratory damage, although review of graphene is ongoing.347 Similarly, 
carbon nanotubes and buckyballs may be toxic when used in humans, 
whereas dendrimers may be a less toxic alternative for use in living 
organisms.348 Particular instances of environmental and health dangers have 
apparently led to overgeneralization, however, and are leading some 
commentators to worry that the toxicity of some nanomaterials has created 
a stigma that encompasses all of nanotechnology in one stroke of the 
brush.349  
And the science-fiction-level hype around nanotechnology has indeed 
led to popular but distorted fears about its safety. Some have even drawn on 
science fiction to dream up sensationalist, apocalyptic scenarios for how 
nanotechnology could herald the end of the world as we know it. Perhaps 
the most infamous of this latter category is the late Michael Crichton’s “gray 
goo:” self-replicating nanobots that escape the laboratory and run amok, 
devouring the entire biosphere and turning it into copies of themselves.350  
Such a nano-apocalypse is unlikely and perhaps even scientifically 
impossible,351 but whether outlandish or reasonable, these fears have been 
enough to spur calls for caution in and even a moratorium on 
nanotechnology development until further research can be done on the 
potential safety impact of the field and appropriate regulations can be put in 
place.352 A 2000 article by Bill Joy of Sun Microsystems even went so far as 
to call for a ban on nanotechnology because of its perceived perils to human 
health and safety.353 Whether such moratoria or outright bans are warranted 
and whether nanotechnology threatens health and environmental harms 
significantly greater than those in other technologies are open questions.354 
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What is clear, however, is that apprehension about nanotechnology’s 
potential hazards have helped obstruct progress in the field.  
 
C. So Why Bother Patenting Science-Based Technologies at All?  
The discussion above demonstrates that to attribute the lack of progress 
in nanotechnology development solely or even primarily to the Bayh-Dole 
Act and upstream patenting, university patenting, or the combination thereof 
overlooks a whole host of other factors that play a much more significant 
role in science-based technologies. This is not to say upstream research 
patenting by universities is entirely inconsequential. On the one hand, the 
costs of licensing upstream university patents may at the margin 
occasionally tip the scales toward nondevelopment, as Professor Lemley and 
others have argued.355 Alternatively, as this author has argued, upstream 
patents may on very rare occasions facilitate downstream development.356 
The vast majority of upstream patents held by universities in science-based 
technologies, however, are simply irrelevant either as a handicap or as a help 
in downstream development. 
The question then becomes, why would universities take the trouble to 
patent their research at all? And why did Congress believe it to be a good 
idea to pass the Bayh-Dole Act and to encourage universities to patent their 
research? If patents on basic university research have so little effect on 
downstream commercialization of that research, at the very least universities 
are simply wasting their already limited resources in bothering to file and 
prosecute patent applications.   
And in fact, universities do not patent the vast majority of their faculties’ 
research, as noted above.357 Very little of university research is eligible for 
patenting, an even smaller percentage is worth the costs of patenting, and 
almost no university research yields profits from patent licensing.358 As a 
result, most university TTOs operate at a loss; again, patenting and licensing 
university research is a money-losing proposition for all but the fortunate 
few.359  
That being said, not all university patents and university research fall 
into the category of basic upstream research, and not all university research 
                                                                                                                          
355 See supra Section II. 
356 Morris, supra note 127, Part I; Emily Michiko Morris, Flexing Bayh-Dole (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
357 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
358 Id. 
359 See Greenbaum, supra note 68, at 331, 358–59 (citing a lack of interest in scientists who wish 
to develop university-owned inventions because almost none of university research yields profits from 
licensing); Thomas K. Grose, A Challenging Matchup, 15 AM. SOC’Y ENG’G EDUC. PRISM 20 (2006) 
(discussing that companies complain that too many university technology transfer administrators have 
an “unrealistic notion that they can make money off of all research”). 
 
 548 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:499 
is performed solely for the sake of knowledge. As a first matter, patents on 
university inventions in applied rather than basic research, such as university 
research in engineering, applied sciences, and some areas of biotechnology, 
require fewer and less risky additional steps to achieve commercialization 
and therefore are easier to license and higher in commercial value.360 And 
even in the basic sciences, patented university research often serves dual 
roles both as upstream building blocks for downstream development and as 
“completed” products ready for use as commercially available research 
tools.361 Second, private firms that sponsor university research will often ask 
the university to patent any consequent inventions and to grant these firms 
exclusive licenses to those patents.362 Patents therefore can be worthwhile 
for the small percentage of university research conducted under private 
sponsorship agreements.363 Third, universities may be willing to invest in 
patenting because of the reputational benefits patents provide,364 although 
publication and other less costly signals of productivity may serve just as 
well.365 
But as for why universities patent research outside of these rather narrow 
categories, the most likely explanation is the “home run mentality” of some 
university TTOs and even faculty.366 Because of what has now become the 
near-mythological status of the patents on Harvard’s OncoMouse and the 
University of Wisconsin’s human stem cell technology, whose unusually 
high commercial value garnered millions in revenue for their respective 
universities,367 many TTOs have come to regard university research patents 
as a sort of lottery ticket through which the TTOs hope eventually to hit it 
big on the one blockbuster patent that will earn untold fame and fortune for 
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the university and the inventing faculty.368 This home-run mindset has led 
TTOs to hold some arguably unrealistic expectations about their patents’ 
value and to focus too much of their limited resources on pursuing patents 
on the technologies with the greatest perceived blockbuster potential.369 
Because of the uncertainty inherent in science-based technologies, however, 
the eventual commercial value of upstream patents in these fields is highly 
variable and difficult to predict,370 much like a lottery ticket. Not 
surprisingly, the home-run mentality has caused universities to invest in 
filing and accumulating patents that ultimately have little to no commercial 
value.  
It is therefore not surprising that, when stuck with patents that turn out 
to have no market value, universities often decide not to pay maintenance 
fees for the patents and allow them to fall into the public domain instead.371 
Professor Kimberly Moore’s study of patent-renewal rates and maintenance-
fee payments provides corroborative evidence, documenting that early-stage 
patents are more likely to lapse for nonpayment of maintenance fees where 
the underlying technologies’ development costs are high and where private 
industry has shown little interest in the technologies.372 And recently, 
Pennsylvania State University went so far as to use an auction of fifty-nine 
of its unlicensed engineering patent portfolios to gather useful information 
on what types of patents were no longer worth the cost of paying 
maintenance fees.373 Thus, although university TTOs may in the short term 
be overly optimistic about patenting their research, in the longer term 
universities seem to recognize that most of those patents are pointless to 
maintain. 
CONCLUSION 
Nanotechnology is promised to be the next technological revolution, but 
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development in the field has been slower than many had hoped. As Professor 
Siva Vaidhyanathan observed in 2005, “right now nanotechnology is more 
science than technology (some would argue more science fiction than 
science).”374 The question is, why? Given the relatively high levels of 
patenting on university research in the area, it is understandable that 
Professor Lemley and several other commentators suspect that these patents 
are hindering nanotech’s development transfer from university research to 
commercialized application. Translating research and knowledge into 
useable technologies depends on more than just intellectual property 
rights,375 and the importance of patents versus other methods of technology 
transfer varies widely from case to case.376 For nanotechnology, many if not 
most of university patents will have little effect on future nanotechnology 
development. Although some very small percentage of nanotech 
development may experience anticommons or other holdup problems 
because of upstream university patenting, development of other applications 
may be experiencing delays that have little to do with patenting ownership 
patterns or the degree of patenting on upstream research. 
First, with regard to the risk of patent-induced holdup problems: a patent 
that covers “basic” or “upstream” research will not necessarily have enough 
preemptive breadth to hold up downstream development.377 Many upstream 
nanotech patents may resemble gene sequence patents in that they require 
downstream work to be of commercial value but still are narrow enough that 
they can be easily designed around using meaningful substitutes. Such 
upstream but substitutable patents are unlikely to cause holdup problems.378 
Unless a patent covers one of the few foundational or “common-method 
research tools” and unless those patents are not licensed freely, little in the 
way of hold up is likely to occur.379 
As compared to patents, moreover, other technological, economic, and 
sociologic issues may be much more significant drags on technological 
development than commonly realized. Nonpatent exclusivities, as well as 
risk aversion, lack of funding, and information gaps, play significant roles 
in the development of science-based technologies such as nanotech. Where 
access to research materials and tools, tacit knowledge, lack of private 
capital, and lack of public support are more rate-limiting than patents, as 
appears to be the case in most of nanotechnology development at this point 
in time, patents are for most intents and purposes simply irrelevant. 
Likewise, the overall effect of patenting depends greatly on the inherent 
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uncertainties of and the time and expense necessary to developing 
downstream applications. Especially in revolutionary new fields like 
nanotechnology, the more time- and resource-intensive downstream 
development becomes, the more uncertainty attaches, and the less likely it 
is that upstream university patents will be important to the outcome. 
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